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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD W. MILLER 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
SHERYL RAE (MILLER) I Case No. 
MARTICORENA
 Defendant,{ 1 3 6 2 9 
and 
SERGIO A. MARTICORENA 
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the Third Party Defendant, 
Appellant Marticorena from a Decree and Order by 
the Family Courts Division of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in which 
the Plaintiff, Respondent RICHARD W. MILLER, 
was declared to be the natural father of the minor child, 
MICHAEL WAYNE MILLER, and awarding said 
child to the sole care, custody and control of the Plain-
tiff, Respondent RICHARD W. MILLER. 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E T R I A L COURT 
On February 6, 1974, the Third Party Defendant, 
Sergio Marticorena appeared before the Family Courts 
Division of the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F . Leary, 
presiding, pursuant to the Plaintiff's Motion and Order 
to Show Cause (R. 11, 14), to then and there show 
cause why the child, M I C H A E L W A Y N E M I L -
L E R , should not be surrendered to the Plaintiff, why 
the sole care, custody and control of said child should 
not be permanently awarded to the Plaintiff, and why 
the Decree of Divorce granted to the Plaintiff and the 
deceased Defendant, Sheryl Rae Miller, should not be 
modified accordingly (R. 9). 
After a hearing in which several witnesses were 
heard, and additional evidence and testimony proffered 
by both Parties, the Court ruled that the Plaintiff, 
R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R , was the natural father of 
the said child and that he should be awarded the sole 
care, custody and control of the said child and that the 
said Decree of Divorce should be appropriately modi-
fied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant Marticorena seeks a reversal of the 
Decree and Order entered below and Respondent asks 
that the Decree of the Trial Court be affirmed. 
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S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
1. On the 10th of May, 1969, the Plaintiff, R I C H -
A R D W. M I L L E R , and the deceased Defendant, 
Sheryl Rae Miller, were married to each other in Provo, 
Utah. (Tr .30) . 
2. Shortly thereafter the Respondent, M I L L E R , 
left for Fort Gordon, Georgia, to begin his active duty 
with the army reserve which was to begin on the 22nd 
of May, 1969. (Tr .30) . 
3. Shortly after the Respondent M I L L E R , be-
gan his active duty with the army he ceased to receive 
any type of communication from his wife. He then 
inquired as to her whereabouts with several of her rela-
tives and was unable to learn of her whereabouts. (Tr. 
33). 
4. The Respondent then decided to apply for emer-
gency leave, which was granted, and went to California 
in the belief that she may have gone to the Los Angeles 
area. (Tr. 33). 
5. Upon his arrival in California the Respondent 
contracted his wife's father who knew where she was 
living in the Los Angeles area and the Respondent then 
immediately went and contacted his wife. (Tr. 33). 
6. In the meantime, while the Respondent's wife 
had been in California, she had been seeing the Appel-
lant off and on for a few weeks until the Respondent 
found her in August of 1969. (Tr. 11). 
7. When the Respondent finally located his wife 
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in the third week of August, 1969, he co-habitated with 
her for three (3) days and two (2) nights (Tr. 32) and 
during which time Respondent and his wife had sexual 
relations with each other. (Tr. 42), and during which 
time the minor child was conceived. (R. 56). 
8. Also, at the time the Respondent located his 
wife, the initial contact being at Appellant's place of 
work, the Appellant Marticorena and Sheryl Rae Miller 
stated emphatically to the Respondent M I L L E R that 
they had not been living together and that they had at 
no time had an affair or sexual relations with each other. 
Such admissions were also made on subsequent occa-
sions. 
9. Respondent then returned to Fort Gordon, 
Georgia, to resume his active duty (Tr. 33) and his 
wife, Sheryl Rae Miller, returned to Salt Lake City 
approximately two (2) weeks after his departure and 
resumed living with her husband, the Respondent, on 
approximately October 17, 1969. (Tr. 32, 33, 34). 
10. Shortly after her return to Salt Lake City, 
Sheryl Rae Miller believing she may be pregnant con-
sulted Dr. Donald M. Kirk, on September 22, 1969, 
who confirmed that she was in fact pregnant, and that 
she had conceived approximately in the third (3rd) week 
of August. The child was then later born on schedule in 
Salt Lake City, in wedlock, to R I C H A R D and Sheryl 
Rae Miller, on May 26, 1970. (Tr. 44). Further, at 
the time of birth Sheryl Rae Miller instructed that a 
birth certificate be filled out listing R I C H A R D M I L -
L E R as the father. 
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11. The Respondent and his wife then continued 
to live together as man and wife for approximately six 
(6) months whereupon the couple separated and the 
Respondent filed for divorce. (Tr. 38) • 
12. The deceased mother, Sheryl Rae Miller, on 
numerous occasions both prior to and after her separa-
tion with Mr. Miller indicated to him and numerous 
others that the child was Mr. Miller's and she further 
indicated that if anything should happen to her, she 
would like Mr. Miller to have custody of the child. 
13. On December 31, 1970, the Respondent, MR. 
M I L L E R , filed his Complaint for Divorce (R.l) in 
the Third District Court; and the Defendant, Sheryl 
Rae Miller, signed an Entry of Appearance and Waiver 
on the 31st day of December, 1970 (R.5), and allowed 
a Default to be entered against her. 
14. The Decree of Divorce between the two parties 
was enterd on March 29, 1972 (R. 9, 10) and became 
final on June 30, 1972. 
15. In the interim the Appellant and Sheryl Rae 
Miller had resumed living with each other and were 
subsequently married on July 30, 1972, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah (Tr. 6). 
16. During all of this time, since the birth of the 
child and up to and including the present, Mr. MIL-
L E R continued to carry on as much of a father-child 
relationship with the child as circumstances permitted. 
The child was taught by the mother that MR. MIL-
L E R was his father and he (the child) referred con-
5 
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tinually to MR. M I L L E R as his father, despite the 
fact that the mother had married the Appellant. 
17. After the marriage of the Appellant and 
Sheryl Rae Miller in July of 1972, they lived together 
for approximately three (3) months, whereupon she 
moved to Provo, Utah, taking the child with her and 
leaving the Appellant in California. 
18. Upon her arrival in Provo she took up residence 
with her parents and lived with them until the Spring 
of 1973. 
19. During this time she was employed with the 
Utah State Employment Office in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and with her income from this employment plus 
support from MR. M I L L E R , she was able to provide 
for the child's support. At no time during this period 
did the Appellant provide any support for his wife, 
Sheryl Rae Miller, and for the child. 
20. In the early spring of 1973, Sheryl Rae Miller 
quit her job and moved back to California, with the 
child, to live with Marticorena, and did so for approxi-
mately two (2) months. 
21. At approximately the end of May, 1973, Sheryl 
Rae Miller then returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, with 
the child, again leaving Marticorena in California, and 
lived with her sister, Karen Wood, for a brief period 
of time and then moved into an apartment located at 
approximately Thirteenth East and Seventy-two Hun-
dred South in Salt Lake City. 
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22. Ti ".•:• - ? it 11 IT approx ima te ly fh»- • nd of 
%
 • i^ the first of September, 197:*, that h< Ap-
pellant moved from California to Salt Lake City, and 
resumed his relationship with Sheryl Rae Miller and 
the child. This relationship lasted for approximately a 
month and one-half when it was terminated by the 
death of Sheryl Rae AFder. m an automobile accident 
near Winnemueca, Nevada, 
-?•'*. Again, during im** intm- \n • «d MR. ^ 
F K R was spending a great deal of tiim with th< chdd 
when he v\ a > in Utah and provided substantia] amounts 
f"i- his support. Th" Appellant provided litth fi. 
suppor t for either h,>, u if or the ehild 
I. During the periods when the child was in Cali-
-•->,;, MR M I ! L E R maintained constant contact 
• • * h: »• * • M:M- snd telephone. 
-'>. On October "20. 107'}. Ilu Respondent joined 
Maiticorena as a Third Party Defendant, and served 
upon him an Order to Show Cause win the child should 
• »< I he delivered to MR. M I L L K R , why the sole care, 
custody and control of the child should not be perma-
nently awarded t< > MR. M i l J -Kl< and \\\\\ the De-
cree of Divorce should not be modified accordingly (R, 
26. Subsequently, =. ihe 31st d, <f October, 
1978, the Respondent's Motion and i >n|< •• to Show 
Cause came on for hearing before the Family Courts 
Division of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, presiding, Roth PnrhVs wer«- »vj)ct-
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sented by counsel, however, the Court took no testi-
mony and heard no evidence, but ordered both Parties 
and the child to submit to a blood test and further or-
dered that the temporary custody of the child should 
be awarded to the maternal grandparents who reside 
in Provo, Utah (R. 16,17,19). 
27. Dr. Stanley Gibbon conducted the tests and 
reviewed the results and on November 13, 1973, ad-
vised counsel for both Parties that neither M I L L E R 
nor Marticorena could be excluded as the natural father 
of Michael Wayne Miller. 
28. On February 6, 1974, the Plaintiff-Respond-
ent's Motion and Order to Show Cause came on again 
for hearing before the Family Courts Division, the 
Honorable Peter F . Leary, presiding, and both Parties 
were duly represented by counsel. 
29. After a hearing in which several witnesses testi-
fied, evidence on the blood tests submitted and ad-
mitted, and proffers of proof concerning the testimony 
of other witnesses being made, the Court granted the 
sole care, custody and control of Michael Wayne Miller 
to his father, R I C H A R D W. M I L L E R . 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT P R O P E R L Y E X -
C L U D E D A L L N O N - A D M I S S I B L E E V I -
8 
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PTCTCCE A N D P R O P E R L Y A D M I T T E D A L L 
A D M I S S I B L E E V I D E N C E . 
As to Appellant 's Point I I and all subsections 
thereunder, the Respondent submits the following argu-
( The Trial Court did not err in xrluding testi-
—1\y by Dr . Donald M. Kirk, M.D. , \\\\h -vspni hi 
u v date of the mother's conception and pregnancy. 
A careful reading of the trial transcript will show 
tiiat Mr. Aadnesen, counsel for the Appellant at the 
f:
'T>'\ did not attempt to introduce Dr . Kirk's testimony 
to show dates of eonerption and delivery, but rather to 
show that Sheryl Kae Miller had made certain state-
ments to him that Ma?ticorcini was the father (Tr . 43, 
44) . • ' 
The (lairs relied upon In counsel in Appellant 's 
Brief pom I up additional shortcomings in Appellant 's 
position. For example. Sheryl Rae Miller made no 
statements to Dr. Kirk on either August 16th, or Sep-
ber 2, of 11)09, because she did not return to Salt 
\e City, for approximately two (2) weeks after Mr. 
. . . _ J . K H left lo r-fu M ti the arm}, a «. her first 
doctor appointment \va* not until September 22, 1969. 
Appellants Brief also states that Mr. Marticorena 
testified thai N!H informed him several weeks before 
M R M I L L E R arrived in California thai she was 
pregnant. I n view of the facts that the child was de-
livered on time, as is admitted in Appellant 's Brief, 
and, as is well-known. th= ment ion prrirwj I\H a human 
9 
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fetus is approximately 280 days, this makes Appel-
lant's statement false and impossible. 
Further, Respondent arrived approximately the 
third (3rd) week in August, in the early part of the 
week (approximately Monday, Tuesday and Wednes-
day - 18, 19 and 20 of August). Substracting 280 days 
from the birth of the child on May 26, 1970, puts the 
date of conception at about the 18th or the 19th. 
All of these misconceptions and misrepresentations 
of dates by the Appellant only seem to indicate that he 
either was completely lacking in any knowledge of the 
true facts, or that he intentionally mislead the Court. 
As to Appellant's additional arguments for allow-
ing in Dr. Kirk's testimony the following arguments 
are made: 
(1) Hearsay: 
(a) As to Appellant's Point 1 (a), it is evident 
from the transcript that the proffer of proof was 
not made to indicate dates but was made to pro-
vide evidence as to statments made by the de-
ceased mother to Dr. Kirk. Therefore, the argu-
ment in Appellant's point is erroneous. 
(b) Appellant argues that statements by the 
mother to Dr. Kirk should be admitted under 
exception 24 to Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. This Rule provides as follows: 
"A statement concerning the birth, marriage, 
divorce, death, legitimacy, race-ancestry, rela-
tionship by blood or marriage or other similar 
fact of the family history of a person other than 
10 
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the declarant if the judge (a) finds that the de-
clarant was related to the other by blood or mar-
riage or finds that he was so otherwise intimate-
ly associated with the other's family as to be 
likely to have accurate information concerning 
the matter declared, and made the statement as 
upon information received from the other or 
from a person related by blood or marriage to 
the other, or upon a repute in the other's family, 
and (b) finds that the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 
(24). 
The rationale for this exception, as for all other 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, is that there is a neces-
sity and a basis for reliability. 
Morgan noted that: "In the light of the . . . 
dangers to which the reception of hearsay ex-
poses the adversary on the one hand, and the ob-
struction to adequate, intelligent investigation 
caused by the exclusion of hearsay on the other, 
it is submitted that the test of admissibility 
should be (a) whether the hearsay is such that 
the trier can put a reasonably accurate value 
upon it as evidence of the matter it is offered 
to prove, and (b) whether direct testimony of 
the declarant is unavailable, or if available, is 
likelv to be less reliable." Morgan, Handbook, 
p. 2i9. 
In addition, Wigmore in his treatise on Evidence ob-
served that in every hearsay exception the following two 
elements exists: (a) necessity and, (b) something in the 
statement or the circumstances of the utterance which 
would serve to guarantee its trustworthiness. Wigmore 
11 
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on Evidence, 3rd Ed. Vol. 5 Sec. 1421-1422, pp. 204-
205. See also Olesen v. Henningsen, (Iowa) 77 NW2d 
40. If the Court finds the trustworthiness of the declar-
ants' statement to be lacking in credibility it may exclude 
a witness' testimony on that basis, or, it may allow the 
testimony to be admitted giving it little or no weight 
because of the lack of trustworthiness in the original 
declarant's statement. 
"I t is not that they have, each and all, a knowl-
edge by personal observation, but that they at 
least know the fact as accepted by family under-
standing and tradition, and that this understand-
ing, based as it was originally on observation, is 
"prima facie" trustworthy." Wigmore on Evi-
dence, Vol. 5 Sec. 1486 (a) (3rd Ed. ) . 
I t is evident from this testimonial qualification that 
supposed or alleged statements made to a physician 
who has had no prior contact or acquaintance with the 
deceased mother are inadmissible because of an obvious 
lack of sufficient knowledge of the family and mother, 
and of the circumstances involved. 
In Re Lewis Estate, 121 Utah 385, 242 P.2d, 565 
(1952) subscribes to this same testimonial qualifica-
tion. Although the Court therein did permit evidence 
from witnesses who were non-relatives, the Court did 
indicate that the relationship between the original de-
clarant and non-relative must be so intimate that the 
witness' interest" . . . would lead them to know the 
truth and that they would not be likely to be mistaken." 
Ibid., at 567. 
12 
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The trustworthiness of the supposed original state-
ment made by the mother is also highly questionable. 
The Court in re Lewis Estate, supra, again stated, at 
page 567, that "such declarations are received in evid-
ence as being the natural effusions of a party who 
must know the truth, and who speaks on an occasion 
when his mind stands in an even position, without any 
temptation to exceed or fall short of the truth." 
How then can a woman who may have been emo-
tionally agitated and greatly concerned over the patern-
ity of the child and the implications this could have on 
herself, her marriage and the expected child be con-
sidered as a person whose mine "stands in an even 
position"? Further, under such circumstances there 
may have been great temptations to lie to the doctor. 
In addition, how can a woman whose sexual activ-
ities, which could be characterized as little else than 
promiscuous, as evidenced by a constant and continu-
ous change in sex partners, really know who the father 
was. Both parties testified that they had sexual rela-
tions with the decedent at or near the time of concep-
tion (Tr. 12, 42), although it has been previously 
pointed out above that MR . M I L L E R was the only 
one who had access to her at the time of conception. 
As has been stated, the original declarant must have 
reliable information. One final authority which sup-
ports this position is as follows: 
"In the event it appears that the evidence offered 
does not emanate from such a source, the pre-
sumption of the reliability of the source of in-
13 
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formation is rebutted and evidence becomes in-
admissable" 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 468, p. 410. See 
ash Re Hurlburt, 68 Vt. 366, 35 A. 77. 
I t is therefore evident that the original declarant's 
knowledge was, at best, unreliable, and that Dr. Kirk 
was not sufficiently involved with the declarant in 
order to be considered a proper witness. 
2. Inconsistency with Prior Divorce Decree: 
Appellant's Brief argues that Dr. Kirk's testimony 
should not have been excluded because no dates of 
birth were mentioned in the Decree of Divorce and 
therefore Dr. Kirk's testimony would not be incon-
sistent with such Decree. This, again, is erroneous. 
Appellant was seeking to introduce evidence of the 
deceased mother's statements on paternity rather than 
a few dates as to conception and birth as has already 
been pointed out. The doctor's statements would there-
fore have been inconsistent with the Divorce Decree. 
Respondent cites Almeida v. Corren, 465 P.2d 564 
(1970) as support for his contention that a prior de-
cree of divorce cannot be used in a subsequent paternity 
action. In that action the Plaintiff was married and 
subsequently gave birth to a child. The child was con-
ceived during her marriage to the first husband but 
born between the dates of her Interlocutory and Final 
Decree of Divorce from her first husband. 
She subsequently brought a paternity suit against 
a Third Party who she claimed had had sexual re-
lations and caused her to become pregnant while mar-
14 
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ried to her first husband. At this paternity hearing the 
Plaintiff introduced, over Defendant's objections, the 
prior Decree of Divorce between herself and her first 
husband. She introduced the Decree to show that since 
the Decree exempted the first husband from paying 
any support for the child, that this was proof that the 
child was not his and therefore was the child of a Third 
Party and the Plaintiff. In ruling on that matter, the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed the lower Court 
stating that "a determination of the husband's non-
paternity in the divorce proceedings was certainly not 
binding upon the Defendant. . . ." Almeida v. Correa, 
supra, 571. 
I t is obvious from the facts of the Almeida case 
that it is not at all in point with the facts of the instant 
action. In the Almeida case there seems to be an at-
tempt by the Plaintiff to draw the inference from the 
release of responsibility to pay support by the first hus-
band, that he was not the father. 
In the instant action the divorce complaint alleged 
(R. 1), and the Findings of Fact (R. 7), and the De-
cree of Divorce (R.9) all found that M I C H A E L 
W A Y N E M I L L E R was the natural child of R I C H -
A R D W. M I L L E R and Sheryl Rae Miller. These 
are direct and definite findings, not tenuous inferences 
from other findings. Further, in the original divorce 
proceedings in the instant action Sheryl Rae Miller was 
a party to the suit (R.l) and was no stranger to the 
action. 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In addition, it is very important to note that Sheryl 
Rae Miller signed an Entry of Appearance and Waiver 
(R. 5) acknowledging that she had received a copy of 
the Complaint and Summons and thereby consenting 
that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree of Divorce could be entered on a Default basis. 
What this consistutes is an adoptive admission. 
Rule 63(8) Utah Rules of Evidene provides that such 
admissions are admissible when the statements are made 
by a party of which the other party ". . . with knowl-
edge of the content thereof has, by words or other con-
duct, manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth." 
The signing of the Appearance and Waiver by Sheryl 
Rae Miller with full knowledge of the allegations in-
volved in the Complaint constituted an admission of 
the statements therein. And all of the elements of an 
admission are present. 
Sheryl Rae Miller had knowledge of and under-
stood the allegations. She was physically able to deny 
them. And she had the opportunity and motive to 
deny the allegations. (See 249 Cal. App. 2d 1006) The 
motive to deny, although the most difficult element to 
prove in most instances, is quite evident in this instance. 
The facts show that Sheryl Rae Miller had returned 
to California and was living there with the Appellant 
when she signed the Appearance and Waiver. Why 
would a woman who is living with a man to whom she 
has allegedly declared that her son is his (Marti-
cornea's) and then turn around and virtually in his 
presence acknowledge the allegations in a Complaint 
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which state that the child is another man's. There is no 
logic to such a situation, and therefore, Sheryl Rae 
Miller had the motive to deny in order to maintain 
harmony and stability in her relationship with the Ap-
pellant and did not so deny. 
(3) S E L F - S E R V I N G S T A T E M E N T . 
Appellant argues that the Court erred in sustain-
ing the objection to Dr. Kirk's testimony on the grounds 
that it is self-serving. The problem involved with such 
testimony is that there is no way to guard against fab-
rication. Sheryl Rae Miller is no longer available for 
cross-examination and it is inequitable to bind the Res-
pondent with statements allegedly made to a witness 
which the opposing party seeks to benefit by. This is 
so because they are hearsay, said statement being used 
to prove the truth of the matter in the statement. In 
Wilcox v. Salomone, 258 P.2d 845 & 850 (Cal. App. 
1953) the Third District Court of California stated that 
such statements 
". . . would be self-serving declarations, and 
hearsay. They would be self-serving since they 
were in support of the interest of respondent. . . . 
****Declarations of a person, deceased or a party 
to the action, made in the absence of the opposite 
party sought to be bound by them, which declar-
ations are in support of the party's or declarant's 
own interest, are not admissible in favor of those 
who claim rights which the declaration would 
maintain/' 
I t is evident from the facts that Sheryl Rae Miller 
made self-serving statements to many individuals as to 
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the paternity of the child, stating that either Miller 
or Marticorena were the father with the primary basis 
of the statements depending solely upon her interest 
at the time the statement was made, i.e., whose side of 
the family she was talking to, benefits to her, animosity 
she may have felt towards a particular individual, etc. 
Appellant further argues that the statement to 
Dr. Kirk should be admitted on the ground that it is 
a declaration against interest. One of the pre-requisites 
for admissions of such a statement is that the declarant 
must have had some particular or special knowledge 
which makes the statement reliable and accurate. In 
Perkins v. Stephens, 131 Mont. 138, 308 P.2d 620 
(1957) the Montana Supreme Court required that the 
declarant have ". . . had adequate means of knowledge". 
(See also Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 19). As pre-
viously stated it is quite possible that Sheryl Rae Miller 
did not really know who the real father was because of 
the circumstances involved. At best, she was stating an 
opinion or estimate which was not reliable, and most 
courts refuse to admit statements against interest where 
the knowledge or perception is based on a shaky opinion 
or estimation. See Smith v. Hansen, 96 P . 1087 (Utah 
1908); Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 P . 642, 23 A.2d 445; 
G. M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty Co., 166 
Ohio St. 401, 2 Ohio Ops. 2d 345, 142 SE 2d 854; 73 
A L R 433. Courts also require that there be no motive 
to falsify. See Smith v. Hanson, supra. No one knows 
what may have been the motive of Sheryl Rae Miller 
in her alleged declaration to the doctor in regards to 
paternity, regardless of who she stated the father to be. 
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This leads us to one further point. For a declara-
tion of this sort to be admitted the statement must be 
against the interest of the declarant. (See Smith v. 
Hanson, supra.; Utah Rules of Evidence 63(10). I t 
is impossible to know what Sheryl Rae Miller's motive 
may have been at the time. Revenge against her hus-
band?; an attempt to placate or please her lover?; put-
ting herself in an advantageous position in case of a 
divorce ? — there is no way to know. 
All of these points raise serious doubts as to 
whether or not Sheryl Rae Miller knew who the father 
was thus providing a basis for the exclusion of such 
evidence under Rules 8, 19 & 22 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence where the Court feels the evidence is unreli-
able. Rule 19 in particular states in part that "as a 
pre-requisite for the testimony of a witness on a rele-
vant or material matter, there must be evidence that 
" . . . he has personal knowledge thereof. . . . " 
I t is further evident from the transcript of record 
(Tr. 42-44) that no foundation was laid by counsel for 
the proffer of such testimony, which foundation may 
have established the reliability of her statements and 
knowledge. 
Appellant's next argument is that the testimony 
should have been admitted under Rule 63 (12 (b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence — Statements of Physical or mental 
condition of declarant. Appellant is again in error on 
this point. Rule 63(12) (b) allows only statements re-
garding "previous symptoms, pain or physical sensa-
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tion", and does not include an exception which allows 
the declarant to testify as to the cause of the problem 
" . . . and the circumstances attendant thereon . . . where 
it is made so long after his injury occurred as not to 
be a part of the res gestae, since it constitutes merely a 
narration of a past event." (20 Am. Jur. Sec. 629, p. 
531, 532.) The declaration of the name of the father 
was not a necessary part in securing the services and 
treatment of the pregnancy, nor was it relevant to de-
clarant's bodily condition. See Utah Rules of Evidence 
63 (12) (b). Nor was the declaration at all spontan-
eous. "When opportunity for formulation of the con-
tent of the statement has existed to sufficient extent to 
prevent the declaration becoming part of the main 
event, the Courts will uniformly reject the statement 
as hearsay, regardless of the character of the declara-
tion or the event it seeks to explain or characterize." 
20 Am. Jur. Sec. 570, p. 564. Leach v. Oregon Short 
Line R. Co. 29 Utah 285, 81 P . 90; Jackson v. Utah 
Rapid Transit Co. 290 P . 970 (Utah 1930); State v. 
Rasmussen, 68 P.2d 176 (Utah 1937). 
2. As to Appellant's argument under P O I N T I I , 
subsection 2, as regards testimony by Marticorena con-
cerning his access to Sheryl Rae Mller, the following 
arguments are submitted: 
This point is illustrative of the fact, again, that 
Appellant and his counsel are misconstruing and ig-
norant of the facts involved. At the hearng, counsel 
for Appellant sought to introduce testimony regarding 
the dates he had met the decedent (TR. 11) which was 
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admitted, and which dates are, as usual, incorrect. He 
also sought to introduce evidence that he had lived with 
Sheryl Rae Miller several months before the conception 
of the child. The Court below, we contend, correctly 
refused to admit such evidence on the basis that it was 
irrelevant and too remote to the period of conception. 
Appellant was, however, allowed to testify to the fact 
that he had had sexual relations with Sheryl Rae Miller 
near the time of conception. (TR 12). The cases cited 
by Appellant on these points in no way support the 
position that testimony concerning access several months 
prior to conception is relevant or material. 
Appellant again misleads the Court in stating that 
Miller was 3,000 miles away at the time of conception. 
As previously stated, the facts indicate that Miller was 
the only one who had access to Sheryl Rae Miller at 
or near the time of conception. The Wright v. Hicks 
case cited by Appellant is therefore not in point, and 
his entire argument is fallacious. 
3. As to Appellant's argument I I (3) concerning 
marital privilege and confidential communications the 
following arguments are made: 
I t should be made clear at the beginning that Re-
spondent has nothing to hide on this point. If the testi-
mony had continued Respondent would have testified 
that Sheryl Rae Miller assured him on numerous occa-
sions that the child was the Respondent's and that she 
had never had any sexual relations with the Appellant. 
H e would have further testified that she had made such 
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representations to many other relatives, friends and ac-
quaintances of Respondent and his deceased wife. The 
objecton was made to protect Respondent from ques-
tions concerning his private marital affairs. However, 
the communications are still privileged for the following 
reasons: 
I t is well established that a communication made 
during a marriage is presumed to be confidential, and 
the party objecting to the claim of privilege has the 
burden of showing that it was not a confidential com-
munication. Blau v. U.S., 340 U.S. 332; California 
Evidence Code Sec. 917; Uniform Rules of Evidence 
28.5. The Appellant in the hearing below made no at-
tempt to rebut the presumption of confidentiality (TR 
34-36). The only argument made by counsel below in 
an effort to get such testimony admitted was his argu-
ment that the privilege does not exist where paternity 
is involved (TR. 35) which is totally incorrect. See 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 28. Appellant cannot 
now on appeal try to overcome the presumption. To 
do so would involve new arguments and constitute rais-
ing a new issue on appeal. Clegg v. Lee, 516 P.2d 348 
(Utah, 1974); Ingram v. Ingram 521 P.2d 254 (Kan. 
1974). Further, the counsel for appellant, rather than 
present arguments to allow Respondent to testify, actu-
ally submitted that the questions were incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial when an objection was made 
on those bases by the counsel for Respondent. (TR. 35) 
Appellant further argues that the claim of confi-
dentiality has been defeated by Sheryl Rae Miller's 
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alleged communications to third parties. When a con-
fidential communication is made the privilege from 
testifying belongs to both spouses. Utah Rules of Evid-
ence, Rule 28(1); Luick v. Arends, 132 N.W. 353. I t is 
a logical deduction from this rule that when one spouse 
communicates the privileged statement to a third party 
without the consent of the other spouse the privilege of 
the unwilling spouse is not vitiated nor obviated, and 
the only spouse who waives the privilege is the disclos-
ing spouse. Savings Union Bank, etc. Co. v. Crowley, 
176 Cal. 543; Cal. Evidence Code Sec. 912 (a). Such 
an argument is sound when it is noted that the com-
munication becomes privileged according to the circum-
stances under which it was made. Wolfe v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 7. 
The argument is further bolstered by the authority 
which supports the position that when a confidential 
writing is transferred from one spouse to the other the 
privileged character of the writing s not destroyed 
when the spouse to whom it is directed turns the writing 
over to a third party without the consent of the other 
spouse. Wilkerson v. Stak, 91 Ga. 729, 17 S.E. 990; 
Scott v. Corn, 94 Ky. 511, 23 S.W. 219; 63 A L R 127. 
I t is to be further argued that the disclosure of 
the communication to a third party who is generally 
the recipient of confidential communications does not 
alleviate nor vitiate the privilege. Simrin v. Simrin, 
233 C.A.2d 90. This would be the case where the com-
munication was made, whether separately or jointly, 
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to a marriage counselor, as in Simrin v. Simrin, Supra, 
to a physician, clergyman, etc. 
The argument concerning inconsistency with a 
prior decree of divorce has been discussed supra. 
(4) As to Appellant's argument 11(4) concern-
ing the admission of a letter alleged to have been writ-
ten by Sheryl Rae Miller, the following arguments are 
made. 
(a) Hearsay: See Respondent's argument con-
cerning Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(24); State-
ments Concerning Family History, supra. 
(b) No Foundation: Appellant's argument that 
Respondent's objection, based on lack of foundation, 
was merely dilatory is absurd and does not merit argu-
ment except to say that laying a proper foundation is 
an important pre-requisite and failure to do so does not 
put the objecting party in the wrong, paricularly when 
the objecting party has a right and a duty to see that 
adverse evidence is supported with a proper foundation. 
(c) Immaterial Incompetent and Irrelevant. I t 
is the rule in numerous jurisdictions that if a question 
is completely objectionable a general objection — that 
it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial — will 
suffice. 157 A L R 598. In this instance the writing 
had no proper foundation, it is quite likely that the 
letter was merely self-serving and based on inadequate 
or fallacious knowledge of Sheryl Rae Miller for the 
reasons discussed supra, and therefore, the letter was 
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objectionable on numerous grounds and a general ob-
jection was proper. 
5. As to Appellant's argument I I (5) concerning 
evidence of payment of hospital bills, the following 
argument is submitted: 
This evidence is obviously irrelevant having no 
tendency to show the paternity of the child. However, 
it may be of interest to the Court that the Respondent 
M I L L E R paid the full hospital bill and was making 
payments on the doctor bill when Sheryl Rae Miller 
left him and went to California to live with the Ap-
pellant. 
And if, as Appellant contends, an adequate found-
ation was finally laid by the end of the hearing why 
did his counsel fail to put him (Appellant Marticorena) 
back on the stand. Respondent cannot be considered 
responsible for this failure. Appellant had an oppor-
tunity to retake the stand and made no attempt to do 
so. 
6. As to Appellant's argument under Point 11(6) 
the following arguments are submitted: 
This argument by Appellant is merely redundant 
as far as Miller and Dr. Kirk are concerned. Also, the 
same argument previously made by Respondent for 
refusing to admit the testimony of Dr. Kir can also 
be made for Dr. Kirk's nurse and Bishop Robert C. 
Meyer. 
However, the following additional points should 
be made clear as regards Bishop Meyer. As previously 
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argued, a witness should not be allowed to testify unless 
he or she is so intimately associated with the declarant's 
family that the information is reliable. Bishop Meyer 
does not stand in this position. The first time he met 
Sheryl Rae Miller and allegedly became acquainted 
with the facts involved was almost two years after the 
child had been born (TR. 48) and after Miller and her 
had separated. (TR. 48). Bishop Meyer was not Sheryl 
Rae Miller's bishop (TR. 48) and he had never talked 
to Miller or counseled them as to their marital problems. 
H e was therefore no more intimately involved with the 
family history than any other stranger with whom the 
matter is discussed for the first time. 
I t is also evident from the circumstances that Re-
spondent's objection on the grounds that the alleged 
statements to Meyer were self-serving (TR. 50) was 
well made. I t is quite possible that a woman as Sheryl 
Rae Miller consulting a new Bishop about marriage to 
a new husband may have had strong desires to appease 
him and win his approval, to avoid his condemnation 
and to placate and win the approval of her future hus-
band. 
SUMMARY O F P O I N T I 
Appellant's entire argument under his Point I I 
rests on the knowledge and interests of one woman who 
it is unlikely had any reliable or actual knowledge as 
to who the father was. In fact, Appellant's entire case 
rests on the statements made only by Sheryl Rae Miller. 
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In addition, it is evident from the circumstances occur-
ring at or about the time that she allegedly made the 
statements that they were quite possibly made to serve 
her own interests. Rule 63 (24) like all other hearsay 
exceptions requires a reasonable degree of reliability 
in the evidence and Appellant failed to provide this and 
he must bear the consequences. 
Further, if Appellant is concerned with the volume 
of people she made representations to, Respondent was 
and is prepared to bring in a large number of witnesses 
who will testify to the contrary — and this gets to the 
crux of the whole matter — Counsel at the original hear-
ing below was prepared to have several witnesses testify. 
As to these witnesses he failed to lay proper foundations, 
have them testify, and he made a number of tactical 
errors. In any event, the Appellant's counsel below 
failed to litigate the matter more fully when it became 
evident that Respondent had co-habitated with Sheryl 
Rae Miller at the time of conception, and that Respond-
ent had numerous witnesses who were willing to testify 
to the contrary of what Appellant's witnesses were at-
tempting to show. These factors, along with the mis-
conception of the whole factual basis of the case have 
characterized Appellant's appeal, i.e., there has been 
a lack of understanding of what went on below and 
what the facts in the controversy actually are. 
At the hearing below Appellant had ample oppor-
tunity to present his case. Any blame for a lost case 
can only result from poor tactics, and trying to rely 
completely on inadmissable evidence. What in effect 
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happened was that there was a presumption to over-
come and Appellant's simply did not so overcome it. 
POINT II. 
LORD MANSFIELDS'S RULE. 
As stated by Appellant the Court below excluded no 
evidence on the basis of this rule and this would be 
therefore a new issue on appeal, and therefore, im-
proper. However, the following arguments are sub-
mitted for the benefit of the court. 
The Lord Mansfield Rule as stated in Lopez v. 
Lopes, 30 Utah 2d. 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) at 689 
P.2d is essentially that 
". . . the spouses themselves may not give testi-
mony which would tend to illegitimatize the 
child." 
Lord Mansfield on this rule stated as follows in 1777, 
Goodright v. Moss, Cowp. 591: 
". . . Though the testimony of parents in their 
lifetime or their declarations after their decease 
might be admissible in cases where proof of the 
marriage was presumptive only, as by cohabi-
tation or general reputation, yet neither their 
declarations nor their personal testimony [of 
birth before marriage] could be admitted to bas-
tardize their issue, where as in this case the fact 
of the marriage was actually proven [by the 
registry entry]. All the cases cited are cases rela-
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tive to children born out of wedlock; and the law 
of England is clear that the declarations [or testi-
mony on the stand] of a father or mother cannot 
be admitted to bastardize the issue born after 
marriage. . . . As to the time of the birth, the 
father and mother are the most proper witnesses 
to prove it. But it is a rule founded in decency, 
morality, and policy, that they shall not be per-
mitted to say after marriage that they have no 
connection, and therefore that the offspring is 
spurious; more especially the mother, who is the 
offending party!3 (Emphasis added) 
The prohibition above is exactly what Appellant 
is attempting to prove, i.e., that the child born after 
marriage is illegitimate. Appellant argues that their 
interpretation of the rule cannot possibly illegitimatize 
the child. This is error. To establish the child as the 
legitimate son of Marticorena he must first destroy the 
presumed legitimacy of the child born during wedlock 
to Miller and Sheryl Rae Miller, thus bastardizing the 
child, and then relegitimatize the child by virtue of 77-
60-14 UC A (1953). 
To do this is contrary to the policy set forth in the 
Lord Mansfield Rule and as it is adopted in Lopes v. 
Lopes, supra. Appellant seeks to introduce statements 
by the mother which would not only "tend to illegiti-
matize" but would allegedly directly and definitely de-
stroy the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock. 
Respondent submits that Section 77-60-14 UCA 
(1953) only applies where the child is not already pre-
sumed to be legitimate and is solely for the purpose of 
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establishing legitimacy of a child previously considered 
illegitimate. If Appellant's argument on this point were 
sustained the effect would be to render empty and non-
efficious the Lopes' decision by allowing parents in a 
dispute to testify in order to bastardize the child and 
then seek to establish paternity in the same or a subse-
quent paternity suit, and then utilizing 77-60-14 to re-
ligitimatize the child. 
In addition, since the policy of such a statute as 
77-60-14 is to protect the child, the initial illegitimation 
of the child in this case would be highly deleterious to 
his welfare. One further point, the Court in Lopes v. 
Lopes, supra., at 689 stated: 
"Of graver moment than the disgrace to them-
selves, it seems repugnant to one's sense of justice 
to allow them to stigmatize the innocent child, 
whose welfare and adjustment will be so cru-
cially affected thereby during his whole life-
time."***". The law in its concern for the broader 
interests of society, and in its sense of justice in 
protecting the interests of the child, has wisely 
provided that restraint upon the parents in the 
Lord Mansfield Rule, leaving the proof of such 
facts where necessary to come from other 
sources." 
P O I N T I I I . 
APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED FULL 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
UNDER THE LAW. 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As to Appellant's Point IV the following argu-
ment is submitted: 
This argument by Appellant is another rehash of 
his prior arguments and an in depth discussion of every 
point made in his argument will not be made. How-
ever, the following points should be made in making 
it clear that Appellant had a fair and equitable hearing. 
Appellant and his counsel at the hearing below 
came into Court hoping to win a favorable decision 
using ,as the basis of their case, some evidence with 
serious questions of admissability and reliability obvious 
before they ever entered the Courtroom. Secondly, they 
were relying on the belief that Miller was 3,000 miles 
away in Georgia at the time the child was conceived. 
Thirdly, they were relying on the testimony of one ex-
pert witness — Dr. Charles Scott. 
The arguments on the inadmissability of Appel-
lant's evidence have already been made. I t should how-
ever, be noted that virtually every item of evidence or 
testimony offered by Appellant below was hearsay, and 
for which counsel for Appellant did not or could not 
lay a proper foundation, and therefore establish reliabil-
ity. This obviously got the Appellant off to a bad start 
leaving his whole case on a shaky foundation when the 
Court recessed to allow counsel and Judge Leary to 
discuss the problems involved with the evidence in the 
case which had arisen to that point. 
I t was in Judge Leary's chambers where a num-
ber of important matters came up. First of all, it was 
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made clear to Mr. Aadnesen, counsel for Appellant be-
low, that Mr. M I L L E R was not in Georgia at the 
time of conception; but had in fact been present and 
had co-habitated with his wife, thus demolishing the 
"sound" basis for his case. Next, it was made clear 
that Respondent had a Dr. Wilmer C. Wiser, present 
who, possessing equal qualifications as Dr. Charles 
Scott, was going to testify exactly opposite to what the 
testimony of Dr. Charles Scott, would have shown, thus 
destroying the third important basis of Appellant's 
case upon which he was heavily relying. 
With this loss of two of the three primary bases 
for his case, all that was remaining was the hearsay 
evidence. And even if every item had been admitted 
Respondent did produce and could have produced ad-
ditional evidence, which would have refuted or balanced 
out Appellants evidence. In such an event Appellant 
could not have established his case by a preponderance 
of the evidence, let alone establishing his case beyond 
a reasonable doubt as is required in Lopes v. Lopes, 
supra. 
I t is for these reasons that Mr. Aadnesen saw the 
futility in continuing to pursue his case to a greater 
and fuller extent, and it is for these reasons that the 
record may appear to be superficial or scant. If this 
was a tactical error, doubtful as that may be, it is not 
reversable error and Respondent cannot take the blame. 
The Court was left, therefore, with no alternative 
other than to award MR. M I L L E R custody because 
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Appellant had not disproved that MR. M I L L E R was 
the father beyond a reasonable doubt. I t is therefore 
evident that a full hearing was had on the matter as far 
as Appellant's counsel felt it needed to go and Appel-
lant has therefore had his day in Court. 
CONCLUSION 
At the hearing below Appellant's case rested on 
shaky grounds. He attempted to show that Respondent 
M I L L E R was not the father and was unable to carry 
the burden of proof. 
The primary thrust of Appellant's Brief has been 
that certain hearsay evidence should have been ad-
mitted under certain exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
All of this evidence and virtually the entire case of the 
Appellant had as its basis and origin the highly un-
reliable knowledge and self-serving statements of 
Sheryl Rae Miller. The unreliability and self-serving 
nature of Sheryl Rae Miller's declarations could not and 
was not over-looked by the Court below. Thus, much 
of the evidence was inadmissible and the burden of 
proof not maintained. The attitude by Appellant that 
the Courts have mulcted him of his child is not a reason 
for reversing on any equity grounds. A Court of law 
is not a tennis match giving the verdict to the winner 
of the best two out of three. 
Appellant has had 'his day in Court' and was 
afforded ample and full opportunity to present his ad-
missible evidence. We believe that justice was done 
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by giving custody over to the true natural father, MR. 
M I L L E R , and Respondent therefore respectfully 
urges the Court to affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brant H . Wall 
Gregory B. Wall 
< ? Attorneys for Respondent 
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